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How We Each Maintain Our Personal Identity
Mark Pexton
In this essay I will address the broad topic of personal identity. This topic deals with the problem of 
how we can truly claim that a person is the same person throughout his life or indeed over any 
period of his life. What is it about a person that means I can refer to him as a continuing entity? I 
will  argue  that  some traditional  approaches  to  identity miss  the real  question  and propose that 
identity resides in a self’s characteristic interaction with the world.  
One’s first response may well be that no, a person is never the same from one moment to the next, 
we refer to people by the same names only for convenience. Our experiences, our environment 
changes us and also we change ourselves from within. Our body is programmed to change when we 
grow older. Indeed we are not even the same from moment to moment, we have moods.
And is there even a self to talk about at all? Hume saw us as composed of our experience. We have 
a perspective but the viewer himself is elusive and indescribable. When we examine ourselves to 
find our self we find nothing but the present content of our experience. 
So when we talk of our own lives what are we talking of, what is it that is born and dies? What is a 
self?
First let us be clear on some terms. We clearly accept that at no two points is a person identical in 
body or in mind, ‘Maximum similarity within the groupings would limit  them to atomic-point-
instants.  The  purpose  of  the  identity  notion  is  wider  breadth,  but  a  grouping  that  included 
everything would not convey specific information’12. But this in my opinion is a different question 
from that of identity and here the main thrust of this essay differs from the view that, ‘the relation of 
identity is logically one-one: I cannot be identical to two distinct people.’13 Identity is an abstract 
12 Robert Nozick, Personal Identity Through Time (pg 108 of Personal Identity ed. by Martin and Barresi, 2007)
13 Brian Garrett, Personal Identity in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, 2005
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term and refers to a thing’s essence – what it is that makes it what it is, what distinguishes it from 
another thing, a description that marks its boundaries, the definition of a thing. So the identity of a 
person is that which matches the definition of a person. So now we can see that the ‘ever-changing’ 
argument against a persisting self misses the point of the question of identity.
To support this use of the term identity, Locke’s consciousness theory14 clearly defines personal 
identity in terms of a continuation of the same consciousness (or memory) which nonetheless does 
change over time. And psychological reductionism argues for a similar thing – former selves share 
the same identity with future selves in virtue of sharing memories and beliefs and a development 
occurring from former to future states. Traditional responses to fission thought experiments treat 
identity as being a matter of sameness15. Consider the case of a single person’s brain being split into 
two so that two brains are made that share exactly the same characteristics and are then placed into 
two bodies that share exactly the same characteristics. The puzzle asks whether the two descendents 
of  the  original  brain,  or  the  descendents  and  the  original,  share  the  same  identity.  Some 
contemporary theorists argue that the descendents cannot both be the same as the original since then 
they would both be the same as each other. I argue that this does not reflect the meaning of identity; 
I will return to my answer to this question.  
In  addition  I  am not  attempting  to  find  the  criteria  for  ascertaining  identity  but  what  identity 
consists of in itself. Sydney Shoemaker in his ‘Personal Identity and Memory’16 treats memory as a 
criterion for ascertaining identity. He found that both bodily and mental criteria are used to ascertain 
identity in the third person and I am sure this is right but it does not answer the question of what it 
is to be someone and not someone else. He uses Locke’s cobbler and prince thought experiment in 
which a prince wakes up in a cobbler’s body (a case of bodily transfer) and the question is whether 
this person is now the prince or the cobbler. Shoemaker finds the case ambiguous since the two 
criteria bodily and mental are in conflict. I will argue however that it is not ambiguous. 
Now to what we mean by self: I propose that it is the interaction between the internal and external. 
The self is the predictable result of interaction with the environment. It is an amorphous mass which 
forms into different shapes according to what environment it faces. Further, consider what things we 
think do not have selves. These include minerals and plants. Some people consider animals to have 
selves but on a much more limited basis than people. Indeed we do not consider animals to be 
persons. The notion of person is I think closely connected to a self. It is a matter of agency, the 
imposition of action on the environment. Harry Frankfurt has a similar thought, ‘It is only through 
our recognition of a world of stubbornly independent reality, fact, and truth that we come both to 
recognise our selves as beings distinct from others and to articulate the specific nature of our own 
identities.’17 Selves are things that have agency, causal power in the way rocks and plants do not. A 
self  is  distinct  from  its  environment;  rocks  and  plants  are  just  considered  members  of  the 
environment rather than a thing which has a separate, contained being.    
So from this  we can now conclude the identity of the self,  the person:  I  suggest  that  it  is  the 
particular, predictable reaction to the environment, whether this is in terms of behaviour or internal 
mental events. With regard to the fission puzzle; if the situation were extended to imagine that the 
two fission descendents were placed into two different worlds then I would argue that they do share 
the same identity despite being distinct entities and they also share the same identity as the original. 
14 John Locke, Chapter 27 of Essay Concerning Human Understanding (2nd edition), 1690 and in Personal Identity, ed. 
by John Perry, 2008 (first published 1975)
15 p2 of Personal Identity, edited by Raymond Martin and John Barresi, 2007
16 Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.56, No.22 (October 22, 1959). And in 
Personal Identity, ed. by John Perry, 2008 (first published 1975)
17 Harry G. Frankfurt, On Truth, 2006 (p101, published by Pimlico, 2007)
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When faced with different environments they will react in the same way and therefore have the 
same identity. In the case of the prince and the cobbler it follows that the person who wakes up is 
the prince since it is in the mind that the characteristic interaction with the environment is produced. 
The body is just a tool for interacting with the environment.  
For me the problem of personal identity is treated by Nozick and others in a confused manner. A 
distinction must be made between quantitative and qualitative identity. It is the case that two people 
can be qualitatively identical since they may both have the same properties but for sure no two 
people  can  be  quantitatively  identical  since  they  are  by definition  two  separate  whole  people. 
Nozick’s closest continuer theory of personal identity18 concerns  qualitative similarity between a 
person at different points in time. The causal connection and similarity of and between two ‘person 
stages’ means that they share the same identity, and whichever ‘person stage’ in the future is most 
closely related to the original takes precedence and continues to hold that identity. However there is 
no reason, according to the earlier distinction in terms, why there cannot be two or more holders of 
the same qualitative identity.  Does it matter  that  two merely quantitatively different people had 
different pasts and so causes for their beings? If they share the same makeup (which contains within 
it a history of thought) then this is all that is needed to discern their shared identity in the present.  
In addition, the view that identity is an extrinsic property, something that depends on persons other 
than the person in question (for example in the case of the two identical fission descendents), strikes 
me as very odd. It does not make sense to say that a person’s identity depends on another thing for it 
to obtain or that a person can cease to continue his identity because there is a tie between two 
closest  continuers.  Whether I am who I  am should depend on something about me and not on 
something else otherwise my identity is not a fact about me at all it is just the trivial dividing of the 
world into separate entities. 
I think a lot of the concern over the nature of personal identity and in particular with regard to 
fission cases is the question over subjective continuation of experience. How can one center of 
experience  result  in  two  or  more  centers  of  experience?  This  is  exemplified  in  the  case  of 
teletransportation. A replica of a man is on Mars after his cells were copied. Or in the case where 
half a brain can continue the functionality of a person and each half is separated into two different 
bodies.  For  we regard  one center  of  experience  (one experiencer)  as  mutually exclusive  of  all 
others. I do not propose to answer this question here as I am providing an objective account of 
personal identity but this issue may account for why it is argued that only one person can have one 
identity.  
It does happen that we consider the identity of a person to have changed. This can only come from 
the  environment.  This  compromises  the  person’s  agency  by  itself  imposing  a  change  in  the 
characteristic interaction of the person. An example of this would be the onset of Alzheimer’s or the 
loss of sight (though not necessarily). The objection to this may be that despite the extreme nature 
of the change, the self is just interacting with the environment in the same way as a less extreme 
external situation. The difference I argue is that the environment can act to diminish the agent’s 
causal power without the agent having autonomy over the change. 
Any change brought about by the person of his own characteristic interaction with the environment 
(a ‘self forming action’) and causal power is a result of the original person acting. The different 
future interaction is therefore a characteristic of the same identity. This raises however the question 
of free will and whether in fact as Kane suggested there is a process by which we can change 
18 Robert Nozick, Personal Identity Through Time (In Personal Identity ed. by Martin and Barresi, 2007)
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ourselves and our identities19. Are there situations where a person could have gone in one of two 
different directions or do we owe our present self to our original self? In terms of identity I think it 
is the case that we are the sum of the different decisions held together in a chain linked to our 
original selves. Our present self can be traced back to the original self and therefore holds the same 
identity. All the decisions made would not have been made had it not been for the nature of that 
original self. 
In conclusion I have found that the identity of a self is held in that self’s characteristic interaction 
with the environment and that two quantitatively different selves hold the same qualitative identity. 
In addition I have found that the environment can impose a change on the identity of a self and that 
a self and the environment are in a conflict of causal powers.
Bibliography
Personal Identity ed. by Raymond Martin and John Barresi, 2003, Published by Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 2007. Containing:
Robert Nozick, ‘Personal Identity through Time’ in Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Belknap Press, imprint of Harvard University Press, 1981. 
Brian Garrett, ‘Personal Identity’ in The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia Of Philosophy, ed. by 
Edward Craig, Published by Routledge, 2005. 
Personal Identity ed. by John Perry, 1975, Published by University of California Press, 2008. 
Containing:
John Locke, Chapter 27 of Essay Concerning Human Understanding (2nd edition), 1694
Sydney Shoemaker, “Personal Identity,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.56, No.22 (October 
22, 1959)
Harry G. Frankfurt, On Truth, 2006, Published by Pimlico, 2007
Daniel C.Dennett, Freedom Evolves, 2003, Published by Penguin Books, 2004 Containing reference 
to:
Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 1996, Published by Oxford University Press, 1996
19 Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will, 1996 and in Daniel C.Dennett, Freedom Evolves (Chp. 4), 2003
54
55
56
